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Changing the Flag: The Cloak of Newfound-
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MARK C. HUNTER
USING REGULAR AND SECRET DISPATCHES between London, St. John’s, and Wash-
ington, intelligence lists of suspect vessels, vessel crew agreements, and data from
the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project [ACSP], this paper assesses the Newfound-
land government’s perspective on policing rum-running to the United States, and
the reaction of the rumrunners themselves. It shows that the nature of Newfound-
land’s government and economy was such that during the 1920s the colony pro-
vided a safe haven for rumrunners.
1
During the American Civil War, Atlantic
shippers who dealt with the southern United States faced increased transaction
costs, and as a result shifted their activities to intermediary points outside the
North’s blockade zone.
2
Similarly, because of the nature of American policing dur-
ing the 1920s, liquor smugglers came under increased pressure from British and US
authorities. Faced with a crackdown, culminating in 1926-7 with the implementa-
tion of formal intelligence sharing to enforce a 1924 anti-liquor smuggling treaty,
many rumrunners shifted their flags to Newfoundland. Their actions, and New-
foundland’s reaction, demonstrate how the country’s economic means shaped its
external affairs policies. With few resources even to enforce prohibition within
Newfoundland, policing rumrunners who hid under Newfoundland registry was
impossible, even when London urged St. John’s to do so.
The development of Newfoundland’s governmental infrastructure was slow,
and its status within the Empire fragile. Both were functions of a narrowly based
economy which supported a relatively small population. Nevertheless, once the
colony possessed responsible government (1855), it was regarded as constitution-
ally equal to the other colonies of settlement, and came to be regarded as one of the
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dominions. Following World War I, however, the Newfoundland government lost
interest in actively controlling its external affairs, and left such matters to London.
By 1923, the Foreign Office took the view that there were two types of dominions:
those like Canada, which London consulted on foreign affairs as an equal, and
Newfoundland. Even after the Balfour Declaration (1926) promised the equality of
Britain and the dominions, Newfoundland remained indifferent.
3
Britain routinely
consulted Newfoundland about issues which affected it — such as the 1924 liquor
treaty with the United States, though it did not make any “declaration as to the ex-
tent of its application.” W.G. Gilmore notes that Newfoundland sometimes at-
tended international meetings, and other times, though invited, was absent. For
instance, Newfoundland accepted Canada’s invitation to attend a Canada-US fish-
eries meeting in 1920 and to participate in the creation of the International Commit-
tee on Marine Fishery Investigations. Furthermore, Newfoundland occasionally
participated in discussions on radio frequency allocation, and, while it made postal
agreements with the United States, was happy to be represented by Britain in the
Universal Postal Union. Gilmore concludes that Newfoundland’s external affairs
infrastructure was in “disorder.” Professionalization began only in 1931, after the
passage of the Statute of Westminster, when a Department of External Affairs was
created — at least on paper.
4
Thus the situation was that Newfoundland’s relations
with Britain were nebulous, its external affairs competence was slight, and its ad-
ministrative infrastructure inadequate. These factors — plus financial stringency
— directly affected Newfoundland’s willingness and ability to comply with Brit-
ain’s policy of doing what it could to help the US government catch rumrunners.
Prohibition came into effect in the United States on 16 January 1920 under the
terms of the Eighteenth Amendment to the US Constitution and the Volstead Act,
which defined alcoholic drinks, by volume, as any beverage with more than 0.5 per-
cent alcohol. The constitutional amendment banned the import and export of alco-
hol, its manufacture, and consumption within American territory. The prohibition
era lasted until late 1933, when, during the height of the Great Depression, the mea-
sure was repealed. Prohibition thus restricted American access to alcohol for thir-
teen years; still, Americans could obtain alcohol illegally by smuggling it from
jurisdictions such as Canada, and from Newfoundland and St-Pierre, where alcohol
controls were less stringent for export and transshipment.
5
Canada also experimented with prohibition, during World War I and during the
years following. Many believed that liquor was the root of lower-class poverty, and
threatened business and society. Greg Marquis argues that as society industrialized
factory owners sought greater control over their works and the reliability of sober
employees.
6
Moral and evangelical reform movements joined in to provide a pro-
gram for lower-class improvement which could provide an alternative to
Bolshevism.
7
However, which level of government had the right to regulate alcohol
was at first uncertain. The federal government claimed such authority because
trade, law, and order fell under its jurisdiction. Provincial governments asserted
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that they had the right to oversee alcohol use because it was a civil rights and “prop-
erty” issue. In 1896 and 1901, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruled
that though Ottawa could regulate the “manufacturing and inter-provincial distri-
bution” of liquor, actual sales were a provincial responsibility.
8
Alcohol regulation
in Canada was therefore a shared responsibility.
Many Canadians became convinced during the war that drinking alcohol di-
verted resources from fighting the enemy.
9
Prince Edward Island was already dry in
1901. Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Alberta, and Ontario followed suit in 1916, and Sas-
katchewan, New Brunswick, and British Columbia enacted prohibition in 1917.
Finally, the Yukon and Quebec banned liquor sales in 1918 and 1919 respectively.
In response, the federal government limited alcohol content in any beverage to 2.5
percent, but permitted alcohol for private use within the home. Citizens could ob-
tain medicinal alcohol legally with a doctor’s prescription, and Ottawa permitted
the distillation and brewing of alcohol beverages, of any strength, for export. Cana-
dians also obtained liquor from bootleg operations, by smuggling, and by mail or-
der. To stem the tide of illegal supplies, Ottawa barred the international and
inter-provincial alcohol trade from 1918 to 1 January 1920. Thereafter, alcohol ex-
ports to the US were permitted on payment of an export duty. Exports elsewhere
were not taxed, and Canadian liquor could be shipped to St-Pierre or Newfound-
land, and then smuggled into the United States — or into dry parts of Canada. As a
result the provinces were allowed a voice, and in 1923-4 Maritime governments
closed bonded warehouses used for alcohol export, thus restricting transshipment
through the Maritimes into the United States. Moreover, the Maritime provinces
were the last to end prohibition: New Brunswick in 1927, Nova Scotia in 1930, and
Prince Edward Island not until 1948. After prohibition ended, provinces sold alco-
hol only through government stores.
10
Prohibition in nearby Newfoundland lasted from 1917 to 1924. The dynamics
of prohibition there, and the policing of rum-running, reflect the trends found else-
where. The Methodist church was the main promoter of prohibition, along with the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union and William Coaker, leader of the Fisher-
men’s Protective Union [FPU].
11
It took World War I, and patriotic demands to con-
serve scarce resources, to convince enough Newfoundlanders to vote for
prohibition. A plebiscite occurred in 1915, and the government implemented the
law on 1 January 1917. Thereafter, alcohol imports, sales, and distribution were
banned, except for medicinal alcohol obtained by prescription and near-beer sales
of beverages containing less than 2 percent alcohol by volume. But, as elsewhere,
an underground economy fed continued demand for drink. Doctors issued copious
numbers of prescriptions, illegal stills condensed weaker brews into stronger bev-
erages, and trade continued and expanded between Newfoundland and St-Pierre.
12
St-Pierre was a focal point in the illicit liquor trade in the northwest Atlantic.
France imposed import restrictions on most of its colonies after the war in order to
conserve foreign currency reserves. The ban included molasses, sugar, and alcohol.
Newfoundland Registry 43
St-Pierre residents realized that prohibition in the United States offered a lucrative
business opportunity, and when import restrictions ended in April 1922, liquor
started to flow into St-Pierre for transshipment elsewhere. The profits transformed
the fishing islands into a prosperous community. Merchants acted as liquor brokers
and charged warehousing fees to store alcohol temporarily. Canadians shipped car-
gos of liquor in bond to St-Pierre, received a stamp on their papers to show they had
landed the liquor, and then returned the goods to Canada for illegal sale. Smugglers
followed similar procedures for delivery to the United States. By the late 1920s,
large foreign companies, mainly distilleries, dominated the St-Pierre liquor trade,
and “St. Pierre merchants, initially in charge of all the business, were relegated to
the role of jobbers.”
13
Atlantic rum-running was a profitable business which found
ways to circumvent the extra transaction costs that governments imposed. Accord-
ingly, rumrunners also came to favour hiding under the registry of a jurisdiction
ill-equipped to stop their activities, rather than operating in the Maritimes where
stricter liquor controls remained in place.
Newfoundland Customs laws gave smugglers an advantage similar to that pro-
vided by St- Pierre. Unlike in the Maritimes, Newfoundland warehouses remained
open for the transshipment of alcohol during the 1920s and Americans were anx-
ious to use them. Dillon and Ross of Holyoke, Massachusetts, wrote to the govern-
ment several times requesting information about bonded warehouses for alcohol
transshipment.
14
The Deputy Minister of Justice, P.J. Summers, explained the New-
foundland law: the word ‘import’ did not include liquor in transit or part of ships’
stores, nor wines imported to be matured and re-exported.
15
Thus liquor brought
into Newfoundland for re-export was invisible in the eyes of the law. On 6 July
1926, for instance, the Eastern Liquor Company landed sixteen cases of whiskey at
Corner Brook for transshipment. The Customs department concluded that since the
liquor “might be consumed on board, transferred on the high seas or landed any-
where” it would not interfere.
16
The government was not concerned with what hap-
pened to liquor so long as bonds or duties were properly paid. On 7 July 1926, I.J.
Klein of United Distillers, Ltd., Montreal, asked “if liquor can be shipped to your
city and then to be exported from there in bond.” The Minister of Justice, W.J. Hig-
gins, replied that Klein could transship liquor through St. John’s, but “[d]uty [was]
payable on entry [at] twelve and a half cents per gallon.”
17
In September 1927, the
Justice department issued a further opinion: under the Customs acts, “where goods
are entered outwards in transit to some place outside this Colony, it is no part of the
duty of the Customs to require any evidence as to where those goods go, or whether
they actually go to the place for which they were entered outwards.” Furthermore,
“it would seem that goods in transit and in bond are not ‘imported,’ and, therefore,
from the point of view of the said Act are not in the Colony” and could be shipped.
18
Consequently, Anglo-American anti-smuggling efforts faced a Newfoundland
government that was willing to turn a blind eye towards smuggling activity and en-
sure that revenues were protected. When the government contemplated tightening
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the laws, a Justice department official concluded in 1932 that if “you insisted that a
place outside the Colony meant a place on land outside the Colony, bonds would
have to be given for delivery of the liquor at such place, and the present high seas
bootlegging business would disappear altogether, with consequent loss of $20,000
to the [Customs] revenue” — presumably from liquor imported into Newfoundland
and then secretly transported to vessels offshore for delivery elsewhere.
19
Liquor
smuggling operated by laws of supply and demand, taking the path of least legal re-
sistance in order to make a profit. The Newfoundland government was clearly
aware of the benefits it received from the rum-running business.
The level of political control that a jurisdiction has over a region, and its eco-
nomic condition, shape smugglers’ behaviour and the response to their activities.
David J. Starkey has shown that such activity emerges in times of economic dis-
equilibrium: stolen and smuggled goods feed the marketplace until employment
opportunities improve and legitimate merchants can provide a steady supply. This
phenomenon occurs in the wake of major wars when demobilized soldiers and sail-
ors re-enter the labour market while normal trading patterns remain disrupted.
20
In
turn, David M. Williams argues that faced with high transaction costs imposed by
tariffs merchants smuggle goods to avoid tariffs that hurt their profits.
21
In addition,
smugglers will shift their flag to those countries with weak enforcement regimes.
22
Only when their activity conflicts with national and international political and eco-
nomic interests do governments crack down on their activities.
23
Consequently, the
behaviour of smugglers can be an important litmus test for the relationship between
a society’s economy and its international relations.
During the period of this study, Newfoundland’s economy was weak and its
government was unable to meet international policing requests. The country had
emerged from World War I with a large public debt and faced seriously adverse con-
ditions in the fish trade. It possessed an economy subject to the whims of the inter-
national commodity marketplace.
24
The efforts of successive governments to
diversify and improve the economy were insufficient to change the overall situa-
tion. Newfoundland was what Richard Parnell has described as a chronically weak
state, where the maritime activities that other states deemed illegal, like smuggling,
grew.
25
Facing severe and intractable financial and economic problems, the govern-
ment had to administer the country through a ramshackle bureaucracy, stumbling
from crisis to crisis.
26
Newfoundland’s own prohibition law was largely unenforce-
able in the face of popular resistance, economic uncertainty, and a lack of police-
men and magistrates.
Society generally tolerated alcohol because it played an important traditional
and economic role in maritime communities, especially those with limited eco-
nomic opportunities, like Newfoundland. Janet Noel notes that merchants were in-
volved in the liquor business, and employed lower-class sailors and fishermen.
27
In
Eastern Canada, employers and workers used liquor as a form of currency, and
boats brought fish to the West Indies to exchange for rum.
28
In the Maritime prov-
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inces, Ernest Forbes concludes, liquor smuggling — rum-running — was a safety
valve for unused economic resources: it was “a re-deployment of the resources of
the fisheries” and “employer of last resort” during the hard times of the 1920s.
Moreover, Maritime governments realized that to police rumrunners meant reve-
nues from liquor law fines. Forbes notes that the “advent of the more complete pro-
hibition of the 1920’s greatly enhanced revenues from this source.”
29
With
restrictions on alcohol in both Canada and the United States, an underground econ-
omy emerged to supply thirsty customers. Police and Customs officials tried to stop
rumrunners, but soon concluded that given stretched police resources and an unco-
operative public, such efforts were futile.
30
Smuggled liquor was a lucrative busi-
ness in a region with a poor economy and high unemployment.
In Newfoundland, the local constabulary did what it could, but outside St.
John’s there were only scattered constables in the outports to enforce prohibition
regulations.
31
Moreover, justices of the peace and Customs officers were often the
same person and had many duties to perform. For example, at Tilt Cove in 1912,
one man acted as Customs officer, telegraph operator, and justice of the peace.
32
The Customs service was small, with few resources for investigation and enforce-
ment. The 1926-7 Newfoundland budget estimates indicate that the only port of
registry, St. John’s, had an Inspector of Customs, one Inspector of Preventative Ser-
vice, a Registrar of Shipping, a Clerk and Surveyor of Shipping, and only one Cus-
toms detective. There were Customs collectors in 145 outport communities, but
these were most likely patronage appointments and it is doubtful they were
Customs enforcement officers. Nevertheless, there was a Protection of Revenue
Service for the island’s west coast, with a budget of $24,050, but the number of offi-
cers attached to the unit is not known.
33
Regardless, the unit was so ill-equipped in
1933 that officers at Corner Brook had to hire a private tug to transport them to the
Marion and Rita, suspected of liquor smuggling. The vessel escaped after a gun
fight, and, because the officers had arrived in a private rather than a government
vessel, the accused later claimed that they had thought modern-day pirates were
boarding them.
34
Ian McDonald concludes that “the Newfoundland government
had acquired little administrative experience or formal administrative machinery”;
this was equally true for aspects of policing and Customs enforcement.
35
In 1919, the government headed by Richard Squires established a royal com-
mission to study the impact of the country’s prohibition law. The commission con-
cluded that the underground economy, including local stills and smuggling from
St-Pierre, weakened prohibition, but offered few suggestions on what to do.
36
Squires, as a lawyer, had represented fishermen from Flat Island, Bonavista Bay,
accused in 1919 of producing and distributing alcohol they made with stills. The
courts postponed the case repeatedly, and, once Squires was prime minister, the
case disappeared. Squires admitted that enforcing the law was pointless without the
active cooperation of the people, and the Newfoundland Constabulary’s Inspector
General complained that he had limited resources and that his men had other laws to
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enforce as well.
37
Furthermore, the government was dependant on Customs duties
for revenue; under prohibition, the revenue from liquor duties had fallen from
$270,843.23 in 1916 to $48,784.31 in 1919.
38
In 1923, Squires, far from a tee-
totaller, was accused of “borrowing” money from the Liquor Controller’s office
and, embroiled in controversy and facing a cabinet revolt, resigned.
39
Thomas
Hollis Walker, who investigated the accusations against Squires, concluded that
“the civil service [was] over-worked, badly trained, inefficient, and in some in-
stances corrupt.”
40
Newfoundland was a failed state, or “lost country,” in the truest sense of the
term; its government was often in crisis and policing its shores was the least of its
concerns.
41
Squires told Reverend Ira F. Curtis that domestic demand for liquor was
great, and enforcement problematic “where Policeman and Magistrates are exceed-
ingly few and far-between.”
42
In 1924 a conservative government led by Walter
Monroe took office.He ended prohibition in August 1924, also recognizing the im-
possibility of enforcement and the chronic need for revenue. Reaction was muted,
but Methodists disapproved of a measure which established “the economic and in-
dustrial life of the country” by throwing “open the doors of government saloons to
the youth of our land.” Still, The Evening Telegram advised its readers to keep an
“open mind.”
43
Undoubtedly, merchants met repeal with glee. Monroe’s Colonial
Secretary and “minister responsible for the act,” was J.R. Bennett, partner in the
Bennett Brewing Company. It had seen little work since prohibition and had almost
gone bankrupt. Meanwhile, Monroe did little to improve the government bureau-
cracy.
44
By 1927 the government faced a $3 million deficit and in 1932 rioters
stormed the Colonial Building. Squires, again prime minister, fled for his life, and
in December 1933, the House of Assembly voted itself out of existence and a Com-
mission of Government, composed of three Newfoundlanders and three British
representatives, ruled the country from February 1934 until 1949.
45
Newfoundland was marked by political instability and was disposed to turn a
blind eye to rum-running. Newfoundland’s position was problematic for Britain,
and, not until responsible government collapsed and London had a direct hand in
running its affairs, did St. John’s become more responsive to British demands to
help police liquor smuggling. As a cross-jurisdictional issue, the general nature of
Anglo-American relations influenced discussions on maritime policing, and Brit-
ain wanted greater help from Newfoundland to appease the United States.
46
Britain
and the United States were allies during the war, but relations were difficult in its af-
termath. The balance of power had shifted towards the United States, and Britain
was for the first time a debtor nation.
47
By 1923, “Britain had to accept full repay-
ment [of war debt], at a fairly high rate of interest, and a scaling down of her de-
mands on her former allies and Germany.”
48
British acquiescence to American
demands that it help it police rum-running was part of the wider British policy of
cooperation.
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To enforce the prohibition laws, Americans seized British-flagged ships be-
yond the American three-mile limit. In 1924, the US Coast Guard increased its pres-
ence off the Atlantic seaboard along “Rum Row,” bordering the three-mile limit,
where up to 100 mother ships serviced smaller boats that ran alcohol ashore.
49
These actions threatened the anticipated revival of Anglo-American trade and were
an “unwelcomed complication” in Anglo-American relations. In response, Ameri-
can Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes proposed a treaty which would per-
mit British ships to carry sealed liquor inside US waters, if American authorities
were allowed to search suspects up to twelve miles from shore. However, British
Foreign Secretary George Curzon, an imperialist who looked back fondly to the
glory days of the Empire, opposed the treaty on the grounds that Washington
wanted to curtail Britain’s maritime rights and constrain the freedom of the seas.
But Foreign Office officials urged Curzon to accept the proposal to prevent Wash-
ington from acting unilaterally. Furthermore, Phillip Lloyd-Greame at the Board of
Trade warned Curzon that his position would “undermine the Baldwin govern-
ment’s efforts to revitalize the depressed shipbuilding industry,” and he threatened
to bring the matter to Cabinet. Curzon dithered until the 1923 Imperial Conference
in hope of finding allies, but he discovered that only New Zealand and Newfound-
land supported his position — the latter’s prime minister, William Warren, simply
thought that the treaty was useless. The British Department of Agriculture and
Fisheries had reservations, presumably because the treaty would set a precedent
whereby a country could exercise its exclusive sovereignty up to twelve miles from
shore. But in the end Curzon acquiesced.
50
As a result, the British government agreed in 1924 to a treaty that (it was
hoped) would allow British shipping to recover its business without undue interfer-
ence from American patrols. The initial draft proposed that both governments
could stop each other’s ships within twelve miles of British or American waters to
determine if the vessel alone, or in cooperation with other ships, had violated the
laws of either country. But the final treaty limited the terms to alcohol, and the dis-
tance to how far a suspect could travel in one hour from the American coast. How-
ever, in practice, the Americans continued to assume a twelve-mile, or greater,
limit.
51
Nevertheless, the compromise upheld the British view that territorial waters
only extended three miles, but recognized the need for US authorities to stop suspect
vessels farther away or pursue them into international waters.
52
Lawrence Spinelli
contends that the treaty “reduced the emotionalism of the liquor issue” and allowed
Anglo-American relations to become more relaxed in the mid-1920s.
53
Conse-
quently, Britain ratified the treaty on 22 May 1924, and, on 17 November, London
informed Newfoundland and other British colonies and dominions that the treaty
was in force.
54
Spinelli notes that the liquor treaty caused rumrunners operating from the Ba-
hamas to shift their operations to Canada, where Britain initially adopted a policy of
“noninvolvement” in liquor smuggling issues.
55
This stance changed as a result of
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the most famous case of a vessel stopped by the US coast guard during the treaty pe-
riod, that of the schooner I’m Alone, built in Lunenburg specifically for the liquor
trade. The I’m Alone Shipping Company of Lunenburg was the legal owner, front-
ing for “a consortium of American bootleggers.” The vessel ran liquor from
St-Pierre to the United States from 1924 to 1928, but “never strayed into U.S. terri-
tory where she would have forfeited her immunity as a British vessel.” The I’m
Alone hid for months, but the US Coast Guard Ship Wolcott found the rumrunner in
March 1929. Believing erroneously that the suspect was inside the twelve-mile pur-
suit zone, the Wolcott followed the I’m Alone and, when it refused to heave to,
opened fire. One man was killed, the I’m Alone took on water, and the crew aban-
doned ship.
56
Legally, this was a Canadian-owned ship in international waters, outside the
distance set by the Anglo-American treaty. A Canada-US arbitration panel, estab-
lished under the terms of the liquor treaty, concluded that the Coast Guard’s actions
were illegal, and the United States paid $50,666.50 in damages. The incident
showed how rumrunners could cloak their activities under foreign registry and
complicate policing efforts. Robert Webb concludes that the incident “left a legacy
of legal confusion and official frustration for government officials and [US] Coast
Guardsmen who were struggling to enforce an unpopular and unwieldy constitu-
tional law.”
57
The incident also annoyed British officials because, despite Canadian
assurances that liquor controls would be tightened, the traffic continued. When
Ramsay MacDonald, the new British prime minister, visited the United States for
talks with President Hoover about a variety of issues, he agreed to pressure Canada
to stop clearing vessels loaded with alcohol for the United States. The Canadian
press supported the American position, and Prime Minister William Mackenzie
King agreed.
58
However, the treaty and its aftermath had little impact in Newfound-
land. Thus, as pressure mounted elsewhere, rumrunners took advantage of local
Customs laws and the fact that the colony’s officials lacked the resources to do
more than check the validity of a vessel’s registry.
59
In order to analyze statistically the Newfoundland-registered vessels that au-
thorities suspected of smuggling liquor to the United States between 1926 (when US
authorities began compiling lists of suspect vessels) and 1933, I compiled a data-
base of 546 ships from intelligence lists created by the American authorities with
the assistance of British consular officials in major US ports.
60
Of these, 298 were
believed to be of Canadian or Newfoundland registry. The British government dis-
tributed the lists to dominion and colonial governments, with the request that local
Customs authorities should keep watch for the vessels, and strip them of their Brit-
ish registry unless they were genuinely entitled to protection under the British flag.
The object of the exercise was to prevent rumrunners from using flags of conve-
nience with which to hide their activities.
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Figure 1. Total Number of Suspect Vessels Smuggling Liquor to the US.
Source: Memorial University of Newfoundland, Maritime History Archives [MHA], Keith
Matthews Series 3, file 2.074, H.W. LeMessurier, Deputy Minister of Customs and Regis-
trar of Shipping, to Arthur Mews, Deputy Colonial Secretary, 31 May 1928 and J. Middleton
to J.H. Thomas, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 14 December 1931 and file 2.082,
J.H. Thomas to Governor Admiral Sir Murray Anderson et al., 31 August 1933; Provincial
Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador [PANL], GN 1/2/0, “Vessels reported to be en-
gaged in the smuggling of liquor into the United States,” enclosure in no. 945, Secret, J.S.
Amery to Sir W.L. Allardyce, 9 November 1926; “Vessels reported to be engaged in the
smuggling of liquor into the United States,” enclosure in no. 393, Secret, J.S. Amery to Sir
W.L. Allardyce, 8 April 1927; “Vessels reported to be engaged in the smuggling of liquor
into the United States,” enclosure in no. 1035, Secret, [illegible] to Sir W.L. Allardyce, 14
October 1927; “Vessels reported to be engaged in Smuggling Liquor into the United States,”
enclosure in no. 414, Secret, Jno. Thomas to Sir J. Middleton, Governor, 12 September 1931.
Note: While the 1928 intelligence report was used to determine those vessels on 3+ reports, it
was omitted from this graph because the number of vessels is so low in the extant report that,
graphed separately, it substantially skewed the graph.
Table 1. Top Five Ports of Registry for Regular Suspects, three-plus reports,
1926-33
Port of Registry N
St. John’s, NF 117
Lunenburg, NS 84
Vancouver, BC 69
Halifax, NS 62
Bridgetown, Barbados 42
Total Number of Ports = 35
Source: See Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows that the total number of all suspect vessels, regardless of na-
tionality or the number of times they appeared in reports, fell during 1926-7 and
rose again in the early 1930s. In contrast, those on more than three lists remained
constant, at approximately 81 ships. It should be noted that individual ships which
appeared on three reports may have left the trade to be replaced by other vessels.
This finding is consistent with the estimates of other scholars. Craig Heron, for in-
stance, states that in total approximately 100 vessels served “Rum Row.”
61
Vessels
on fewer than three intelligence reports were removed from the list in order to elim-
inate those falsely suspected or rarely engaged in smuggling. This process gener-
ated the names of 151 distinct vessels that authorities deemed to be regular
smugglers.
62
The ACSP database held descriptive data for only 35 of these 151 vessels
(23.2%). These were necessarily registered in Newfoundland and the Maritime
provinces, given the nature of the database.
63
Twenty-five were hybrid sail-steam
vessels, seven were sail-only schooners, while only three were fuel-only. The aver-
age suspect had one deck, two masts, and was about 100 feet long, 22 feet wide,
with a depth of 10 feet. The average gross tonnage was 124 tons, while net tonnage
was about 107 tons. For those ships with engines, the average horsepower was 14.6.
Regular rumrunners were sleek vessels able to quickly smuggle liquor past the au-
thorities.
64
From the intelligence reports, the top five ports of registry (Table 1)
were St. John’s, Lunenburg, Vancouver, Halifax, and Bridgetown, Barbados.
65
These ports had ready access to the United States, but were far enough away to be
clear of American authorities. The pattern is similar to that which Ashcroft ob-
served for the Civil War blockade era.
66
French registry appeared at least fifteen
times for those ships deemed regular suspects, but not specific French ports. Pre-
sumably, this was because the investigators were more interested in those vessels
that claimed British or American registry. In terms of overall ownership patterns
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(Table 2), the ACSP database provided data on 77 of the 298 Canadian and New-
foundland suspects.
67
Most of them were owned by shipping companies and mer-
chant/mariners.
68
However, it is unclear if all owners were involved knowingly, or
if the smuggling was just carried out by crew members.
Faced with a crafty enemy that operated from a variety of ports around the
northwest Atlantic, the Americans and the British responded with a web of intelli-
gence. Beginning in 1926, the United States sent lists of suspect vessels to Britain,
which were forwarded to Newfoundland.
69
The Dominions Office warned the
Governor of Newfoundland, Sir W.L. Allardyce, that ministers should maintain
strict secrecy about this operation.
70
London explained that if the company owning
a vessel operated outside British dominions, then it was “not entitled to be regis-
tered as owner of a British ship.” In the case of vessels acquired from foreigners,
registrars had to be especially careful in inspecting the authenticity of documents.
71
If they had sufficient evidence that a vessel applying for British registry was in-
volved in smuggling, registrars should “place all possible impediments in his way
and delay or even refuse the necessary formalities [British documents],” especially
if it was “owned or controlled in America.” London wanted to help Washington as
much as possible by “way of administrative action up to the extreme limit permitted
by our existing laws.”
72
London hoped that intelligence, and administrative actions
against the smugglers, would prevent dubious vessel transfers and stifle the trade.
But because of Newfoundland’s Customs laws and lax policing, smugglers used
Newfoundland registry. Indeed, as the crackdown continued, smugglers increas-
ingly shifted their vessels’ registries from ports in the Maritime provinces to New-
foundland.
For each intelligence report filed between 1926 and 1933, I collected owner-
ship data from the ACSP database for Newfoundland-registered ships suspected of
smuggling liquor to the United States, so long as they appeared in three or more in-
telligence lists. While the sample remains smaller than I would like, with some
missing data early in the series, Canadian ownership of Newfoundland-registered
vessels became common during the late 1920s and clear by the early 1930s (Figure
3). Moreover, the official figures show a general downward trend in the number of
Canadian-registered ships and an increase in the number of Newfound-
land-registered ships, while the number of “usual suspects,” those on three or more
reports, regardless of port of registry, remained about constant (Figure 2) — 81
ships. Data from the ACSP database reveals that from the outset of the intelligence
gathering effort there was Canadian ownership of Newfoundland-registered ves-
sels (Figure 3). Then, owners gradually switched a large number of vessels that they
had registered in Canadian ports to registry in Newfoundland and Barbados. Of 34
Canadian vessels that switched registry and remained on the suspect list, twelve
switched to the Newfoundland. Of these, five switched in 1927, one in 1930, and
six in 1931.
73
Moreover, these trends reflected the timing of the implementation of
the liquor treaty, the intelligence sharing protocols, the US Coast Guard’s attack on
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Figure 2. Suspect Vessels in at Least Three Reports.
Source: See Figure 1 and ACSP database.
Figure 3. Ownership Patterns of Newfoundland-Registered, Regular Suspects.
Source: See Figure 1 and ACSP database.
the I’m Alone in 1929, and the associated increase in pressure on the Canadian gov-
ernment for action. Although these statistics are from official sources, the large
number of openly Newfoundland-registered, Canadian-owned vessels certainly
underscores a larger trend of Canadians hiding their activities under Newfoundland
registry and escaping the notice of the authorities.
The advantage offered by Newfoundland registry was clear, because local au-
thorities investigated and tracked vessel ownership with a marked lack of effi-
ciency. Of the Sunner, for example, suspected of liquor smuggling in late 1926,
“Newfoundland Customs authorities knew nothing ... until she came into the pos-
session of Mr. Penny,” and the ship was now “loading fish at this port for export.”
Governor Allardyce told the British ambassador in Washington that the ship had
never “cleared in any port of Newfoundland for Havana, Cuba” or to the high seas.
Consequently, “[a]s she has never obtained clearance in Newfoundland on false
pretences, no action lies against her master or owner.”
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Meanwhile, to other re-
quests for specific investigations, the government gave only evasive replies. On 25
January 1927, Allardyce told the Dominions Office that all suspect vessel registra-
tions were in good order, adding that the “Registrar is very careful with regard to
British Registry and will continue to exercise such care, especially bearing in mind
the illicit liquor traffic with the United States.”
75
The governor made similar com-
ments in later years, with little difference in the wording, and with no indication that
Newfoundland took British requests seriously.
76
Allardyce simply questioned “as-
sumptions that because of the latter [Anglo-American] Convention, persons en-
gaged in the illicit liquor traffic are to a considerable extent abandoning ports in
Nova Scotia for those in Newfoundland.”
77
Yet, rumrunners did exploit Newfoundland, a fragile link in the intelligence
and enforcement chain. The statistical analysis of ports and vessel owners above
suggests that owners were Canadian, and St. John’s was a popular port of registry.
But the small sample size for which data was found necessitates several vignettes to
illustrate the actual behaviour of the rumrunners. Their cargo loaded, suspected
rumrunners from Newfoundland ports traveled south to non-American destina-
tions and could claim that they were on a legitimate voyage elsewhere when the au-
thorities confronted them. Nelson Dicks, for example, lived in Sydney, Nova
Scotia, and registered his ship, the Thea, in Newfoundland. However, the registry
noted that Samuel Hardy, from Port aux Basques, owned the ship on behalf of Dicks
and gave the latter “some protection from the Canadian authorities should his
schooner run afoul of Canadian laws.”
78
If operating from Newfoundland, under
the terms of Newfoundland Customs laws respecting liquor transshipment, Dicks
had broken no laws.
79
During 1926-7, another ship, the Chautangua, transferred its
registry to St. John’s, soon after it appeared in intelligence reports, but remained un-
der the same owner, Jeremiah Petite, a “mariner,” of Halifax, Nova Scotia.
80
A1927
voyage brought the Chautangua along the American seaboard, near “Rum Row”
off New York. The vessel left St. John’s in late April and arrived at Bahia Blanca on
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24 May. On 6 July, it was at Saint John, New Brunswick, and in August it departed
Halifax for Barbados, where it arrived on 1 October.
81
According to the official voyage records, the ship remained in the Caribbean,
stopped at the Turks Islands on 26 October, and then returned north. Crisscrossing a
wide region from north to south, the schooner could have rendezvoused with faster
liquor-transport vessels, and then proceeded onward with her legitimate voyage,
the authorities none the wiser.
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The case of the Chautangua suggests the strategy
of suspected liquor smugglers once they became known to enforcement agencies.
Moreover, as policing efforts continued, smugglers used technological adaptations
and Newfoundland markings to throw the authorities off their trail. On 16 Decem-
ber 1930, for instance, the US Coast Guard captured the Maskinonge, an “oil-screw
vessel” from Lunenburg, Nova Scotia, at the mouth of the Sakonnet River, Rhode
Island. The Malagash Fishing Company, Lunenburg, owned the ship, but had regis-
tered it at St. John’s a month earlier. The vessel was “the most up-to-date craft espe-
cially equipped with a radio and smoke screen apparatus for the smuggling trade.”
The vessel’s lawyer, Daniel T. Hagan, admitted that she had violated American law
and “therefore there will be no complaint made by the owners to the Canadian gov-
ernment.”
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The arrest on 26 August 1930 of the auxiliary schooner Nova V, also registered
at St. John’s but owned by William Basil Moriarty of Halifax, illustrates further the
tactics smugglers used to elude detection. Her mate, John McLeod, who used the
alias John Davis, had been involved in liquor smuggling to the United States before,
and was wanted on an outstanding warrant. The ship had radio operators to coordi-
nate smuggling activities and the Coast Guard explained to the British Consul Gen-
eral at New York that the radio equipment was “was thrown overboard before the
seizure of the vessel.” In addition, US authorities found “name plates marked
‘Munengetcre of St. John’s, N.F.,’ apparently intended to be placed over the name
and home port on the hull of the vessel to disguise her identity.”
84
Indeed, this prac-
tice may explain why some suspected Newfoundland ships are missing from the
ACSP database, making the statistical analysis so problematic. On board, the US
Coast Guard found rye, gin, and whisky worth US$200,000 at “bootleg prices.” Yet
the captain and crew claimed they were lost in fog en route from St. John’s to Ber-
muda. Moriarty also owned two other suspected rumrunners, the Apohaqui and the
Ocean Maid. The latter vessel appeared in all extant intelligence reports during the
period 1926-33; it switched to Newfoundland registry in 1927, and continued oper-
ations.
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The case of the Nova V and her sister ships owned by Moriarty reveal that
rumrunners saw advantages in associating with Newfoundland, obtaining liquor
there, and trying to smuggle it into the United States.
Significant pressure on St. John’s-registered rumrunners came only after the
introduction of greater British control through the Commission of Government.
86
The Amulree commission criticized Newfoundland’s bureaucratic immaturity and
in response the new Commission government reorganized many departments, in-
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cluding Customs.
87
Britain loaned a member of its Board of Customs, P.D.H. Dunn,
to Newfoundland as Customs Inspector, adviser, and Chairman of the Customs
Board and Board of Liquor Control.
88
Then, in December 1934, the Commissioner
of Finance, E.N.R. Trentham, a Briton, put the Mercantile Marine Office under
Customs department supervision to ensure better vessel inspections.
89
Before the
reforms, two detectives and four excise officers inspected vessels and warehouses
in St. John’s. Henceforth, a senior preventive officer, two preventive officers, six
preventive men, and two detectives would probe any discrepancies and thoroughly
question those involved.
90
Beyond St. John’s, the Commission also pensioned el-
derly employees, increased training, and concentrated foreign trade in major com-
munities for inspection.
91
Finally, in April 1935, the government purchased two
former rumrunners and converted them into Customs vessels to police the seas.
92
By April 1938, the governor asserted that “the increased efficiency of the Customs
Department in general, and the Cutter Service in particular, has led to a very consid-
erable reduction in smuggling.”
93
In the international realm, the Commission government admitted that parties
exported large quantities of liquor bound for the “high seas” or “Bermuda” from
bonded warehouses in St. John’s. Further investigations revealed that from 1 July
1934 to 24 January 1935 16 gallons of “alcohol and spirits” had been exported to
Canada, 1,665 gallons to St-Pierre, 3,300 gallons to the United States, and 106,040
gallons to the British West Indies.
94
At the same time, the Roosevelt administration
urged London in 1934 to “secure the extension of these restrictions [against
rum-running] to Newfoundland” to prevent Customs’ revenue losses now that pro-
hibition had ended.
95
Consequently, on 23 February 1935, London told Washington
that “the Newfoundland government would enact stricter regulations” to stop li-
quor smuggling into the United States.
96
Thus, under British direction, Newfound-
land cooperated. The Commission compiled its own data on suspect smugglers,
forwarded the reports to London, and confessed that the ships noted in their reports
(Table 3) were “in each case owned and controlled by persons resident in other
countries.”
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Further scrutiny, for example, showed that the Casanova was regis-
tered to the Cashin Import and Export Company of Newfoundland, but the “real
owner is suspected to be a Captain Moriarty of St. Pierre who is a notorious smug-
gler of goods into the United States of America.” The governor assured London that
Newfoundland was monitoring Moriarty’s activities and that “any information re-
garding him is communicated to the American Consul General in St. John’s di-
rect.”
98
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Table 3. Vessels cleared from St. John’s with Liquor, 1 July 1934 to
3 January 1935
Date Cleared Vessel Cargo (cases) Cleared For
9 July 1934 Tatamagouche (s) 1,000 High Seas
31 July 1934 Mudathalapadu 1,200 Bermuda
1 September 1934 Malbo (s) 893 Bermuda
22 September 1934 May & June (s) 1,000 Bermuda
26 September 1934 Placentia (s) 1,667 Bermuda
3 October 1934 Margaret S II (s) 1,800 Bermuda
22 October 1934 Ganneff (s) 1,750 Bermuda
24 October 1934 Margaret S II (s) 1,500 Bermuda
29 October 1934 Anna (s) 33 St-Pierre
6 November 1934 Margaret S II (s) 1,500 Bermuda
9 November 1934 Mudathalapadu 1,050 Bermuda
24 November 1934 Margaret S II (s) 1,680 Bermuda
5 December 1934 Thomas & Robert 975 Bermuda
8 December 1934 Mudathalapadu 1,193 Bermuda
11 December 1934 Margaret S II (s) 1,784 Bermuda
3 January 1935 Placentia (s) 1,845 Nassau
10 January 1935 Mudathalapadu 433 Bermuda
Source: PANL, GN 1/1/7, Dispatches to the Colonial Office, Secret & Confidential, 1927-35,
file “Secret 1935,” W.H. Horwood, Administrator, to J.H. Thomas, Confidential 21 Febru-
ary 1935.
Note: (s) denoted vessels registered in Newfoundland.
CONCLUSION
During the 1920s, Newfoundland lacked the proper government apparatus through
which to manage the country’s international interests and left external affairs to
London. Nevertheless, preventing rumrunners from smuggling liquor into the
United States, then under prohibition, was a challenging international dilemma.
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Britain agreed in 1924 to help the United States police rumrunners by allowing the
US Coast Guard to pursue suspects up to twelve miles from American shores. This
undertaking inevitably involved Canada and Newfoundland. Subsequently, the US
and Britain established an intelligence sharing protocol to track suspect smugglers
and investigate their right to protection under British registry. London expected lo-
cal authorities to ensure that only those ships entitled to the protection of the British
flag registered in imperial ports, including St. John’s. Consequently, London for-
warded lists of suspect vessels to St. John’s and expected the government to check
the legitimacy of the papers that belonged to any Newfoundland vessels on the list.
But Newfoundland lacked the resources and the will to cooperate effectively in a
coordinated and sustained manner. It was unable to enforce its own prohibition law
from 1917 to 1924, and thereafter, like St-Pierre, took advantage of the money that
it could make from the transshipment of alcohol to destinations elsewhere. Conse-
quently, from 1924 to 1933 the government acknowledged receipt of correspon-
dence from Britain regarding Anglo-American efforts to cooperate to police
rumrunners, but did little else. The smugglers were not seen as an important issue
and, not surprisingly, weak enforcement efforts attracted smugglers to Newfound-
land registry.
Between 1926 and 1933, approximately 81 ships serviced thirsty Americans,
smuggling alcohol from Newfoundland or St-Pierre to the United States, though
ostensibly bound elsewhere. These ships were relatively small, equipped with sail
and fuel engines, and often had wireless facilities to coordinate operations. In the
Atlantic, their owners based the vessels out of strategically located ports, just be-
yond the range within which the US Coast Guard could stop them. However, as the
rumrunners came under more intense American policing efforts, and the 1924
treaty came into force along with the web of Anglo-American intelligence, the
smugglers shifted their registry to St. John’s.
Without a professional and devoted external affairs department, or strong po-
lice and Customs force, stopping the rumrunners was far from Newfoundland’s
most pressing concern. Newfoundland matches the characteristics seen elsewhere
that permits pirates and smugglers to thrive. Moreover, the dynamics of Newfound-
land’s response to liquor smuggling reveals much about how St. John’s viewed for-
eign affairs issues. Gilmore notes that Newfoundland was content to leave such
matters to Britain because St. John’s lacked the governmental structures to deal
with these issues in a sustained manner. Newfoundland was an inactive agent in in-
ternational affairs, unless something, typically economic, threatened its interests
directly. Even then, as a poor state, it relied on strong leaders to sustain diplomatic
efforts, and, beyond talk, it could do little. Newfoundland’s response to liquor
smuggling to the United States shows that a region’s economic abilities and needs
are just as important in formulating its response to external affairs as the status of its
political development. With a poor economy and no institutionalized external af-
fairs department, Newfoundland was unable to respond well to British requests to
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stop vessels from smuggling liquor to the United States. Newfoundland’s reaction
only changed with the new Commission regime that came to power in 1934 and
Britain controlled Newfoundland’s domestic, international, and financial affairs
completely.
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